

*How much influence, and when it can be ignored: the full two-pass research report*

1992 TO 2025 · FOUR ELECTORAL TIERS · PREPARED 06 JUNE 2026

**Prepared:** 2026-06-06 | **Scope:** Post-EDSA, 1992-2025 | **Tiers:** National executive, Senate, congressional districts, local executives | **Local cases:** Manila, Quezon City, Makati, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City | **Method:** Multi-source deep-research harness, two passes, adversarial verification of extracted claims | **Status:** Pass 2 complete (all four Pass 1 gaps addressed; remaining data limits noted in Section 7)

## Executive summary

The deference Philippine politicians show the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) is **partially but not uniformly warranted**. INC influence is real and statistically demonstrable at the margins, but its decisiveness is **strongly tier-dependent and conditional on how close the race is**, not a blanket national power.

Three facts, taken together, define the whole answer:

- 1. The mechanism is strong.** The best causal evidence (Ravanilla 2025, peer-reviewed, triple-difference design) finds a near-unit-elastic link between a municipality's INC concentration and the vote share of INC-endorsed senators ( $\beta = 0.97$ ), with essentially zero effect for non-endorsed candidates ( $\beta = 0.01$ ). That is the statistical signature of a disciplined bloc.
- 2. The bloc is small in absolute terms.** The 2020 census counts ~2.8M INC members (2.6% of population). The deliverable vote is smaller: SWS exit-poll data puts INC at roughly 4.25-5% of the electorate, about **1.5M votes**. Cohesion is ~75-80% in presidential races and ~56-68% for senatorial candidates down-ballot.
- 3. A small-but-disciplined bloc only decides close races.** Applying the decisiveness test, INC can plausibly swing outcomes **only where the margin is within ~1-1.5M votes**: the marginal 12th Senate seat, congressional districts, and tight local-executive contests. In lopsided national executive races it is neither necessary nor sufficient.

Layered on top is a **strong reverse-causation problem**: INC tends to endorse poll-leading frontrunners. The 2010 endorsement list was released two days *after* the final SWS survey and mirrored it. INC switched to Arroyo in 2004 only once she led FPJ. "INC endorsed the winner" is weak evidence of power.

**Crucially, across 33 years and all tiers, no single case has been verified where an INC-endorsed longshot demonstrably won because of the bloc.** The closest candidate is Bam Aquino in 2025 (16th in the final SWS survey, finished 2nd), but anti-Duterte sentiment and name recall are equally plausible explanations. The absence of a clean underdog-won-because-of-INC case is itself a finding, and one that should temper the strongest claims about INC causal power.

**Bottom line:** INC is a precision instrument, not a sledgehammer: decisive at the margin, marginal at the top. Deference is rational insurance in close down-ballot and local races. It is largely overstated theater in national executive contests.

## Decision matrix

Tier / race type	Typical margin	INC bloc vs. margin	Verdict	Confidence
President / VP, lopsided	Millions	Bloc << margin	<b>Ignorable</b>	High
President / VP, tight (e.g. 2016 VP, ~263k)	Hundreds of thousands	Bloc ≥ margin	<b>Potentially decisive</b>	Medium
Senate, top of "Magic 12"	Millions	Bloc << margin	<b>Ignorable</b> for safe seats	High
Senate, marginal 12th seat (e.g. 2007, ~18.5k gap 12th vs 13th)	Tens of thousands	Bloc >> margin	<b>Plausibly decisive</b> (capacity demonstrated)	High
Congressional district	Thousands-tens of thousands	Depends on local INC share	<b>Decisive where INC is concentrated</b>	Medium
Local executive, close	Hundreds-thousands	Bloc can exceed margin	<b>Plausibly decisive</b> (8.5% of 2007 mayoral races <2% margin)	Medium

*"Decisive" means demonstrated capacity to swing (bloc ≥ margin), not proof the bloc delivered the result.*

## Method and how to read the numbers

- **Decisiveness test.** A contest is scored "decisive-capable" only when the estimated INC vote is plausibly ≥ the margin of victory in a race INC's side won.
- **Reverse-causation control.** "Endorsed the likely frontrunner" is separated from "delivered the result." The strongest pro-influence evidence would be an endorsed underdog who then won; the strongest skeptic evidence is a frontrunner who lost despite endorsement.
- **Cohesion is inferred, never measured.** The secret ballot makes bloc compliance unobservable. Every cohesion figure is an exit-poll estimate with a range.
- **Self-reports are an upper bound.** INC's own membership claims are treated as a ceiling; census and SWS electorate shares are the defensible range.
- **Geography is bounded.** No precinct-level INC concentration data exists publicly; inferences sit at barangay/municipality/province level.
- **Verification note.** Pass 2 adversarial-verification agents failed due to a tool infrastructure crash (0-0 abstain on all 25 claims). Pass 2 findings are labeled "(unverified by harness, reliable source)" where the underlying source is primary or well-established secondary. No Pass 2 claim was actually disproven.

## 1. Bloc size and cohesion

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**Size.** The 2020 PSA Census counted **2,806,524 INC members, 2.6% of the national population (PSA)**. The frequently cited "2.8 million votes" overstates the deliverable vote because it is a population headcount including non-voting children. The SWS/TV5 2010 exit poll (52,573 respondents) put INC at **4.23% of presidential votes (~1.53M) and 4.28% of VP votes (~1.51M)** (Mangahas/SWS).

**Defensible deliverable bloc: ~1.5M votes.**

**Regional concentration (2020 census).** Central Luzon leads at **597,448 INC** (~21.3% of all INC nationally), followed by CALABARZON (494,599) and NCR (441,815), together over 1.5M, roughly two-thirds of all INC members (Inquirer; unverified by harness). INC is overwhelmingly a Luzon phenomenon.

**Cohesion.** Robust but not monolithic, and tier-dependent:

- **Presidential (~75-80%):** 81% for Estrada (1998), 74% for Arroyo (2004), 84.8% for Aquino (2010) per GMA Network; 77.1% for Aquino and 77.2% for Duterte per SWS exit polls (GMA; Mangahas/SWS).
- **Senatorial (~56-68%):** materially weaker, with 32-44% defection down-ballot (Mangahas/SWS).

**The mechanism, quantified.** Ravanilla (2025, *Comparative Political Studies*): a 10-point rise in municipal INC share associates with a **~9.7-point rise in the endorsed candidate's vote share ( $\beta = 0.97$ , indistinguishable from 1.0)**; non-endorsed candidates show  $\beta = 0.01$  (Ravanilla 2025). The paper also addresses the reverse-causation threat using the Reproductive Health Bill divide: among INC-endorsed incumbents who voted *anti-RH* (against INC's official position), the unit-elasticity result still holds, indicating the effect is not merely an artifact of endorsing pre-aligned frontrunners (eScholarship preprint; unverified by harness).

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## 2. Geographic concentration

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### National pattern

INC is a **Luzon-dominated, Central Luzon-anchored bloc**. Nine of the top ten provinces by total INC population are in Luzon, with Nueva Ecija (114,208; 5.07% of all INC) and Cavite (106,130; 4.71%) leading in absolute terms. By **INC share of a province's own population**, the metric relevant to local decisiveness, **Tarlac leads at 7.43%**, followed by Aurora (5.97%) and Nueva Ecija (5.85%) (Rappler map; unverified by harness). These are the provinces where the bloc most plausibly tips close local races.

### Metro Manila / NCR

Metro Manila holds 373,147 INC members, **16.57% of all INC nationally, but only 3.16% of Metro Manila's ~11.8M residents** (Rappler map; unverified by harness). A 3% share is too small to be decisive in most Metro Manila mayoral or congressional races unless the race is extremely tight.

## Six-city case reads

**Quezon City.** The clearest INC stronghold in Metro Manila. INC's Central Office, Central Temple, and national administrative headquarters are in **Barangay New Era**, where roughly **~95% of residents are INC members** (Wikipedia, New Era QC; unverified by harness). The INC district office lists multiple congregations across QC. However, New Era is one barangay among 142 in QC, and the broader QC electorate (registered voters ~1.4M+ in 2022) dwarfs any single barangay. At the city-mayor level, INC concentration is insufficient to decide a QC mayoral race without a razor-thin margin. At the *district* level (congressional), a precinct cluster around New Era could matter in the right district.

**Manila, Makati, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City.** No city-level INC voter share or margin analysis from public data exists for these five cities. What is known: INC concentration in the Visayas and Mindanao (where Cebu, Iloilo, and Davao sit) is well below the Luzon average; the top-10 INC-concentration provinces are all in Luzon. Cebu City and Iloilo City are Visayas cities where Catholic and non-INC evangelical blocs dominate; Davao City is a Duterte stronghold where political identity is more dynasty-driven than religious. **INC is unlikely to be locally decisive in these five cities except in exceptionally tight races where margins fall below a few hundred votes.**

**Remaining gap:** Precinct-level or barangay-level INC voter share for the five non-QC cities is not in public data. This is a structural data limit, not a research gap that additional passes can fully close.

## 3. Endorsement track record by tier, 1992-2025

### National executive (President / VP)

INC's presidential picks from 1992 to 2022 backed the eventual winner in every cycle. But in each case the endorsed candidate was either already the frontrunner or INC switched to whoever was leading:

- **1992:** Endorsed Ramos (won; Ramos was the plurality leader in a crowded field). (*n/v*)
- **1998:** Endorsed Estrada (won; 81% bloc cohesion per GMA). Estrada was the dominant frontrunner.
- **2004:** Endorsed Arroyo, but **delayed until Arroyo led FPJ in polling** (Mangahas/SWS; Pass 1 verified). Cohesion ~74%.
- **2010:** Endorsed Villar initially, **switched to Aquino five days before the election once Aquino led** (Mangahas/SWS; Pass 1 verified). Cohesion ~84.8%.
- **2016:** Endorsed Duterte (won by ~6.6M votes). Bloc ~1.5M << margin; not decisive. Cohesion ~77.2%.
- **2022:** Endorsed Marcos Jr. (won by ~16M votes). Bloc << margin by orders of magnitude; not decisive. (*n/v*)

The one national-executive race where the bloc was *within range* of the margin is the **2016 VP contest (~263k margin)**, which Mangahas concedes INC may have mattered in (Inquirer).

### Senate, pre-2016 record (1992-2013)

New from Pass 2:

**2007:** INC endorsed 12 candidates; **9/12 won, 3 lost:** Defensor (14th), Sotto (15th), Recto (19th). Crucially, **Juan Miguel Zubiri's 12th-place win was later vacated** after Maguindanao cheating allegations in 2011; he was replaced by Pimentel (Rappler; unverified by harness). This is the weakest recent endorsement showing and documents that INC-endorsed candidates lose.

**2010:** INC endorsed 12 candidates; **all but one won.** But critically: **INC released its list two days after SWS's final pre-election survey, and the list mirrored the SWS results** (Rappler; unverified by harness). This is the strongest single data point for reverse causation in the entire record: INC endorsed who was already winning. The lone loss: Biazon, who finished 14th.

**2013:** 10/12 endorsed won. The INC-endorsed underdog test fails here: **Richard Gordon was endorsed but finished 13th, roughly 700,000 votes behind 12th-place Gringo Honasan** (also endorsed). Gordon did not benefit from the bloc despite endorsement (Rappler; unverified by harness). Pre-2016 INC endorsements were dominated by frontrunners: Noli de Castro 1st in 2001, Mar Roxas 1st in 2004, Bong Revilla 1st in 2010, Grace Poe 1st in 2013, all polling leaders at time of endorsement (Wikipedia; unverified by harness).

**1992-2001:** Specific endorsement lists and margins not recoverable from public data in this pass. (*gap remains*)

### **Senate, 2016-2025 (established in Pass 1)**

Win rates: 10/12 (2016), 11/12 (2019), 10/12 (2022), 7/8 (2025). Endorsed losers in every cycle.

### **Congressional districts**

No verified district-level INC endorsement and margin data exists in public records. Theoretically the tier where a concentrated bloc is most decisive (small electorates). The 2013 Rappler Namfrel precinct analysis cited in Pass 1 (which was infrastructure-killed, not disproven) reported extreme INC bloc concentrations in specific precincts. This remains a structural data gap.

### **Local executives**

**The Caloocan case (direct skeptic evidence):** An INC-backed mayoral candidate lost decisively to incumbent Oscar Malapitan in Caloocan, **301,867 to 172,278**, a margin of ~130k, well above any plausible INC local concentration (Inquirer; unverified by harness). This is a documented endorsement failure at the local tier.

The theoretical capacity remains: 8.5% of 2007 mayoral races (139 of 1,634) were decided by margins under 2%, and the average municipal INC share is ~2%. In those specific tight races, the bloc could plausibly exceed the margin. But Ravanilla's paper does not confirm INC was concentrated *at or above the margin* in those 139 municipalities, and the Caloocan case shows endorsement does not automatically deliver the local result.

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## **4. Why politicians pander, and the skeptic's rebuttal**

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**The pandering logic.** Endorsement is courted via high-profile pilgrimages to INC's Central Office. Both major candidates typically seek it simultaneously. The cost of asking is low; the potential payoff,

~1.5M disciplined votes, is real insurance in a close race. For the marginal Senate seat or a tight local contest, skipping the courtship is irrational.

### The skeptic case (well-evidenced).

- **Mangahas/SWS:** INC endorses candidates based on who polling shows is most likely to win, calling the decisive-factor reputation a "**myth**", while conceding it mattered in the tight 2016 VP race and for Sen. Recto (*Inquirer*).
- **Reyes (Philippine Social Sciences Review, 2017):** An endorsement yields only ~58-61% of INC votes and ~600k-1M total, benefiting **trailing candidates near the margin/cutoff** rather than frontrunners who get only ranking shifts (*UPD journal*; unverified by harness). Crucially, Reyes also confirms reverse causation: the likelihood of receiving an endorsement is itself positively related to a candidate's projected winning margin.
- **The 2010 proof case:** INC released its 2010 senatorial endorsement list two days *after* the final SWS survey, and the list mirrored the survey. It is difficult to construct a cleaner demonstration that INC was following the polls, not leading them.

The skeptic case and the "strong mechanism" case are not contradictory. A bloc that reliably moves ~0.6-1.5M votes is exactly the kind of force that decides a 12th Senate seat and is irrelevant to a multi-million-vote presidential blowout.

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## 5. Recent dynamics (2025)

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### January 2025 "National Rally for Peace"

The INC held a large rally on January 13, 2025 in Manila amid the Marcos-Duterte political rift and mounting ICC/impeachment dynamics against Rodrigo Duterte. The rally was framed as a call for national peace but was widely read as a political signal, a show of organizational strength at a moment when both major political blocs were courting INC's allegiance for the May 2025 midterms. Specific attendance figures and the full political reading are not resolved to a single verified source in this pass; the Wikipedia article on the rally was fetched but the harness did not isolate specific verifiable claims.

### Full 2025 endorsed senate slate

INC endorsed 8 candidates. **7/8 won; Revilla finished 14th.** Final rankings of endorsed candidates:

Endorsed candidate	Final rank	Pre-election SWS rank	Notes
Bong Go	1st	Top tier	Frontrunner; not INC-decisive
Bam Aquino	2nd	16th (23%)	Surged dramatically (see underdog discussion)
Ronald Dela Rosa	3rd	Top tier	Frontrunner
Rodante Marcoleta	6th	18th (17%)	Surge attributed to Duterte sympathy (Pass 1)
Alan Cayetano	9th	Mid-tier	Not a close call
Cynthia Villar	10th	Mid-tier	Not a close call
Imee Marcos	12th	Mid-tier	Marginal seat; bloc could have contributed
Bong Revilla	14th	Mid-tier	<b>Lost; strongest 2025 skeptic data point</b>

(Inquirer; unverified by harness)

The Imee Marcos 12th-place finish is worth noting: the 2025 Magic 12 race was competitive at the bottom, and if her margin was within the INC bloc's deliverable range, this could be a quiet case of bloc decisiveness. But margin data for the 12th vs 13th gap in 2025 is not resolved in this pass.

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## 6. The endorsed-underdog test: the finding and its absence

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Across 1992-2025, **no single case was verified where an INC-endorsed longshot demonstrably won because of the bloc**, with bloc-vs-margin and geographic concentration evidence. This is the strongest pro-influence proof the research question called for, and its absence is itself a finding.

**The best candidate: Bam Aquino, 2025.** Aquino was ranked 16th in the final SWS survey (23% support, May 2-6) before finishing 2nd nationally (Inquirer; unverified by harness). He is from the Liberal/opposition bloc, not a Duterte-sympathy beneficiary. If the INC endorsement drove his surge, this would be a genuine underdog case. But alternative explanations are equally plausible: anti-Duterte sentiment consolidation, name recall (Aquino family brand), and a general opposition wave that also lifted Kiko Pangilinan (not INC-endorsed). **No precinct or geographic decomposition distinguishing the INC effect from these alternatives exists in public data.** The case is suggestive but not verifiable.

### Other near-misses (all disqualified on closer inspection):

- Recto 2013: was endorsed in 2013 after losing in 2007; won, but was polling comfortably inside the Magic 12 before endorsement.
- Gordon 2013: endorsed but finished 13th (~700k behind 12th place). INC couldn't lift him.
- Biazon 2010: endorsed but finished 14th. INC couldn't lift him either.
- Marcoleta 2025: surged, but the surge was geographically anti-correlated with INC concentration (Pass 1 verified).

**Verdict on the underdog test:** The absence of a verified case across 33 years and all tiers should shift the prior *against* the causal-delivery claim. INC can move the bloc and the mechanism is real. But the historical record contains no clean instance where an endorsed trailing candidate won *because* the bloc put them over the top, in a race where other explanations can be ruled out. The most the evidence supports is "the bloc could swing marginal races where the right conditions are met", not "the bloc has swung them in the past."

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## 7. Verdict: when deference is warranted, when it can be ignored

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### Is the deference warranted? Conditionally, and only down-ballot.

- **Where it is warranted, court the endorsement:** The marginal 12th Senate seat in close years (the 2007 math is decisive-capacity); congressional districts in INC-concentrated provinces (Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Aurora); and tight local-executive races in Central Luzon and

CALABARZON where INC share exceeds 5-7% of the provincial electorate. Here a disciplined ~0.6-1.5M bloc can exceed the margin.

- **Where it is overstated, safe to discount:** Lopsided presidential, VP, and top-of-Magic-12 Senate races. The 2016 Duterte and 2022 Marcos Jr. wins had margins in the millions; the bloc was irrelevant to the outcome. The INC "backs every winner" record is largely explained by endorsing frontrunners, not by swing.
- **The real switch is competitiveness, not tier alone:** The 2016 VP race (~263k margin) is the one recent national-executive case where the bloc plausibly re-enters decisive range. Any national race decided by less than ~1M votes would warrant genuine concern.
- **In Metro Manila's large cities:** A 3.16% INC share across NCR means the bloc is below the margin threshold in most mayoral races (where winners typically win by tens of thousands). QC Barangay New Era is an exception in a narrow geographic band around the INC complex; it can swing a congressional district race in that specific area.

**On the pandering itself:** The low-cost-insurance model explains the behavior rationally even if the power is overstated. Politicians who skip the pilgrimage to INC's Central Office take a small but real risk (being blamed if they lose by a thin margin). Politicians who court INC lose very little even if the endorsement proves electorally marginal. The behavior is therefore neither irrational nor proof that INC's causal power is as large as the ritual implies.

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## 8. Remaining data limits after Pass 2

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These are structural limits. Further research passes are unlikely to fully resolve them:

1. **Precinct-level concentration data for Manila, Makati, Cebu, Iloilo, Davao.** Does not exist in public data. City-level INC decisiveness for these five cities cannot be bounded beyond the 3% Metro Manila average.
2. **1992-2001 senatorial endorsement record.** Specific endorsed slates, win counts, and margins for the first three post-EDSA cycles are not consolidated in accessible public sources.
3. **Congressional-district INC cases.** No systematic database of INC endorsements and margins at the district level exists publicly.
4. **The 2025 Magic 12 bottom margin.** The exact gap between 12th (Imee Marcos) and 13th place in 2025 is not resolved; if it was within the INC bloc's range, it would be a 2025 decisiveness case.
5. **The Bam Aquino underdog decomposition.** Whether INC or anti-Duterte sentiment drove his 2025 surge cannot be resolved from available public data.

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## Appendix A: Election-by-election evidence table

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Verification status: ✓ = Pass 1 verified | (u) = Pass 2 unverified-by-harness (infrastructure crash), reliable source | (n/v) = not verified this project

Year	Contest	Tier	INC-endorsed	Outcome	Victory margin	Est. INC vote	Decisiveness	Source
1998	President	Exec	Estrada	Won	Large plurality	~1.5M (81% cohesion)	Fronrunner; not demonstrated ✓	GMA Network (u)
2004	President	Exec	Arroyo (switched to once leading)	Won	~1.1M	~1.5M (74% cohesion)	Endorsed only once leading → reverse causation ✓	Mangahas/SWS ✓
2007	Senate	Senate	12-slate	9/12 won; Defensor 14th, Sotto 15th, Recto 19th lost; Zubiri 12th (later vacated)	~18.5k (12th vs 13th)	~1.03-1.10M deliverable	<b>Decisive-capacity</b> for 12th seat; 3 endorsed losses = skeptic evidence ✓	Ravanilla 2025 ✓; Rappler (u)
2007	Mayoral (national)	Local	Various	139 of 1,634 races <2% margin	<2%	~2% avg municipal INC share	<b>Could-swing capacity</b> , not demonstrated ✓	Ravanilla 2025 ✓
2010	President	Exec	Aquino (switched from Villar 5 days out, once Aquino led)	Won	~5.7M	~1.53M (84.8% cohesion)	Switched to leader → reverse causation ✓	Mangahas/SWS ✓
2010	Senate	Senate	11/12 endorsed won; Biazon 14th lost	INC list released 2 days after final SWS survey, mirroring SWS	varies	~1M down-ballot	<b>Strong reverse causation</b> , endorsed already-leading slate; Biazon loss = skeptic evidence (u)	Rappler (u)
2013	Senate	Senate	10/12 endorsed won; Gordon 13th lost (~700k behind 12th-place Honasan)	Gordon endorsed but lost	~700k gap (13th vs 12th)	~1M down-ballot	Endorsed underdog (Gordon) FAILED, skeptic evidence (u)	Rappler (u)
2016	President	Exec	Duterte	Won	~6.6M	~1.5M (77.2% cohesion)	Bloc << margin → not decisive ✓	Mangahas/SWS ✓
2016	VP	Exec	(n/v)	Tight race	~263k	~1.5M	<b>Within bloc range</b> → potentially decisive ✓	Inquirer ✓
2016	Senate	Senate	12-slate	10/12 won; Tolentino 13th, Romualdez 15th lost	varies	~56-68% cohesion	Mixed; endorsed losers = skeptic evidence ✓	Inquirer ✓
2019	Senate	Senate	12-slate	11/12 won; Jinggoy Estrada 15th lost	varies	~1M down-ballot	Mixed ✓	Wikipedia ✓
2022	President	Exec	Marcos Jr. (n/v)	Won	~16M	~1.5M	Fronrunner; bloc << margin → not decisive (n/v)	Esquire (n/v)
2022	Senate	Senate	12-slate	10/12 won	varies	~1M down-ballot	Mixed ✓	Wikipedia ✓
2025	Senate	Senate	8-slate	7/8 won; Revilla 14th lost; Bam Aquino 16th→2nd; Marcoleta 18th→6th	varies	~1M down-ballot	Marcoleta surge = Duterte sympathy, not INC ✓; Aquino surge = ambiguous, alternative explanations equally plausible (u)	Rappler ✓; Inquirer (u)

Year	Contest	Tier	INC-endorsed	Outcome	Victory margin	Est. INC vote	Decisiveness	Source
2016	Caloocan mayor	Local	INC-backed challenger	Lost to Malapitan, 301,867 vs 172,278	~130k	Local INC share << margin	<b>Endorsement failure</b> , skeptic evidence (u)	Inquirer (u)
1992/1995/2001	Senate	Senate	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	<b>Not established</b>	n/a
1992-2025	Congressional districts	House	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	<b>Not established</b>	n/a
Manila/Makati/Cebu/Iloilo/Davao	Local executive	Local	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	<b>Not established (structural data gap)</b>	n/a

## Appendix B: Sources

### Primary / peer-reviewed ✓

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*Report produced via a two-pass deep-research harness. Pass 1: 18 sources, 88 claims extracted, 25 adversarially verified, 16 confirmed. Pass 2: 18 sources, 86 claims extracted, 25 attempted-but-infrastructure-failed; all Pass 2 findings labeled accordingly. Confidence is highest on bloc size, cohesion, the causal mechanism, and the Senate/presidential decisiveness logic. Confidence is medium on the six-city local read (QC only) and the underdog verdict (absence confirmed). Confidence is lowest on pre-1992-2001 and congressional-district tiers (structural data limits).*